R. v. Teskey (L.M.), (2007) 364 N.R. 164 (SCC)

• Judge: McLachlin, C.J.C., Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein, JJ.
• Court: Supreme Court (Canada)
• Case Date: February 22, 2007
• Jurisdiction: Canada (Federal)
• Citations: (2007), 364 N.R. 164 (SCC);2007 SCC 25;412 AR 361;404 WAC 361;EYB 2007-120453;[2007] ACS no 25;47 CR (6th) 78;364 NR 164;74 Alta LR (4th) 1;JE 2007-1147;280 DLR (4th) 486;220 CCC (3d) 1;[2007] SCJ No 25 (QL);[2007] 2 SCR 267;73 WCB (2d) 457;[2007] 8 WWR 385

R. v. Teskey (L.M.) (2007), 364 N.R. 164 (SCC)

MLB headnote and full text

[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

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Temp. Cite: [2007] N.R. TBEd. JN.002

Leo Matthew Teskey (appellant) v. Her Majesty The Queen (respondent)

(31544; 2007 SCC 25; 2007 CSC 25)

Indexed As: R. v. Teskey (L.M.)

Supreme Court of Canada

McLachlin, C.J.C., Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein, JJ.

June 7, 2007.

Summary:

The accused was charged with aggravated assault, break and enter and possession of stolen property over $5,000.

The Alberta Provincial Court, after several adjournments, found the accused guilty on all three charges, but entered a conditional stay respecting the possession of stolen property. The court indicated that written reasons would be issued within a short time. The Crown indicated that it would be commencing a dangerous offender application. The Provincial Court adjourned sentencing. The accused appealed his conviction. The grounds of appeal cited delay. The consent of the Attorney General to institute dangerous offending proceedings was not forthcoming.

The Alberta Court of Appeal, in a decision reported at 320 A.R. 264; 288 W.A.C. 264, adjourned the conviction appeal sine die. The court directed the Provincial Court to proceed to the sentencing. The Provincial Court was obliged to proceed to the dangerous offender application if the Attorney General consented. If not, the court had to sentence the accused in the routine way. The Court of Appeal urged the Attorney General to decide his position on the dangerous offender application. The Court of Appeal referred to the absence of written reasons by the Provincial Court. More than 14 months after the close of evidence and more than 11 months after orally convicting the accused, and within days of the Court of Appeal's adjournment decision, the Provincial Court issued written reasons. The first 16 paragraphs of the reasons addressed the delays.

The Alberta Provincial Court, in a decision reported at [2005] A.R. Uned. 386, found the accused to be a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence respecting the aggravated assault charge. At the conviction appeal several issues were raised, including whether the court should consider the Provincial Court's written reasons for conviction where they were issued long after the notice of appeal was filed.

The Alberta Court of Appeal, Berger, J.A., dissenting, in a decision reported at 391 A.R. 155; 377 W.A.C. 155, considered the written reasons and dismissed the appeal. The accused appealed, asserting that the Court of Appeal erred by considering the written reasons.

The Supreme Court of Canada, Bastarache, Deschamps and Abella, JJ., dissenting, held that the written reasons should not have been considered. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial.

Courts - Topic 583

Judges - Duties - Re reasons for decisions - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "A judge is not precluded from announcing a verdict with 'reasons to follow'. ... However, in all cases, a trial judge should be mindful of the importance that justice not only be done but that it appear to be done. ... Reasons rendered long after a verdict, particularly where it is apparent that they were entirely crafted after the announcement of the verdict, may cause a reasonable person to apprehend that the trial judge may not have reviewed and considered the evidence with an open mind as he or she is duty-bound to do but, rather, that the judge has engaged in result-driven reasoning. In other words, having already announced the verdict, particularly a verdict of guilt, a question arises whether the post-decision review and analysis of the evidence was done, even subconsciously, with the view of defending the verdict rather than arriving at it. It is most important in a criminal case to guard against any result-driven consideration of the evidence because the accused is presumed innocent and entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is not always obvious. Its presence may be far more subtle and only discernible through the eyes of the person who keeps an open mind. It is in this sense that the trial judge who appears to have already committed to a verdict of guilt before completing the necessary analysis of the evidence may cause a reasonable person to apprehend that he or she has not kept an open mind. Further, if an appeal from the verdict has been launched ... and the reasons deal with certain issues raised on appeal, this may create the appearance that the trial judge is advocating a particular result rather than articulating the reasons that led him or her to the decision." - See paragraphs 16 to 18.

Courts - Topic 583

Judges - Duties - Re reasons for decisions - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that the necessary link between a verdict in a criminal case and the reasons that led to it was not broken every time there was a delay in rendering reasons after the announcement of the verdict - Trial judges benefited from a presumption of integrity, which in turn encompassed the notion of impartiality - The reasons proffered by a trial judge in support of a decision were presumed to reflect the reasoning that led to the decision - Judicial integrity encompassed the expectation that judges strive to overcome personal bias and partiality and carry out the oath of their office to the best of their ability - Impartiality was essential to trial fairness - Fairness and impartiality had to not only be subjectively present but had to also be objectively demonstrated to the informed and reasonable observer - Even though there was a presumption that judges would carry out the duties they had sworn to uphold, the presumption could be displaced - The onus was therefore on an appellant to present cogent evidence showing that, in all the circumstances, a reasonable person would apprehend that the reasons constituted an after-the-fact justification of the verdict rather than an articulation of the reasoning that led to it - See paragraphs 19 to 21.

Courts - Topic 583

Judges - Duties - Re reasons for decisions - A trial judge, after several adjournments, found an accused guilty of three offences - The judge realized that he had not given the accused an opportunity to address the court before entering the convictions and invited him to do so, indicating that he would advise him if the decision changed - The accused declined to address the court - The trial judge indicated that written reasons would follow - The accused appealed - The grounds of appeal cited delay - The Court of Appeal, in adjourning the appeal, referred to the absence of written reasons - More than 14 months after the close of evidence and more than 11 months after convicting the accused, and within days of the Court of Appeal's adjournment decision, the trial judge issued written reasons - The first 16 paragraphs addressed the delays - The accused asserted that the written reasons should not be considered on the appeal because there was a reasonable apprehension that they were crafted to respond to the grounds of appeal - The Alberta Court of Appeal considered the written reasons and dismissed the appeal - The Supreme Court of Canada allowed an appeal and ordered a new trial - The trial judge's reasons did not appear to have been crafted to answer points raised in the appeal - However, this did not answer the broader question of whether a reasonable person would apprehend that the reasons were in effect an after-the-fact justification for the verdicts - Given the delay, the court could not reasonably be confident that the reasons reflected the reasoning that led the trial judge to his decision - The delay combined with the following factors constituted cogent evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of integrity and impartiality: the trial judge's difficulty in arriving at a verdict in the months following the completion of the evidence; the bare declaration of guilt without any indication of the underlying reasoning; the trial judge's expressed willingness to reconsider the verdicts immediately after their announcement; the nature of the evidence that called for a detailed consideration and analysis before any verdict could be reached; the trial judge's failure to respond to repeated requests to give reasons; the reasons referred to events long after the announcement of the verdict; and the inordinate delay coupled with the absence of any indication during that time that the reasons were ready or that the trial judge had purposely deferred their issuance pending an application to have the accused declared a dangerous offender.

Courts - Topic 590

Judges - Duties - Duty to appear just and impartial - [See all Courts - Topic 583 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 4687

Procedure - Judgments and reasons for judgment - Reasons for judgment - Time for - [See all Courts - Topic 583 ].

Cases Noticed:

R. v. Sheppard (C.), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869; 284 N.R. 342; 211 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 50; 633 A.P.R. 50; 2002 SCC 26, refd to. [paras. 2, 27, 37].

Crocker v. Sipus (1992), 57 O.A.C. 310; 95 D.L.R.(4th) 360 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 16].

R. v. R.D.S., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484; 218 N.R. 1; 161 N.S.R.(2d) 241; 477 A.P.R. 241, refd to. [paras. 20, 31].

Robbie the Pict v. Her Majesty's Advocate, [2003] ScotHC 12, refd to. [para. 30].

Wewayakum Indian Band v. Canada and Wewayakai Indian Band, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259; 309 N.R. 201; 2003 SCC 45, refd to. [para. 31].

R. v. Elrick, [1983] O.J. No. 515 (H.C.), refd to. [para. 31].

R. v. Smith & Whiteway Fisheries Ltd. (1994), 133 N.S.R.(2d) 50; 380 A.P.R. 50 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 31].

R. v. Lin, [1995] B.C.J. No. 982 (S.C.), refd to. [para. 31].

R. v. Burns (R.H.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 656; 165 N.R. 374; 42 B.C.A.C. 161; 67 W.A.C. 161; 89 C.C.C.(3d) 193; 29 C.R.(4th) 113, refd to. [para. 33].

Counsel:

Deborah R. Hatch, for the appellant;

James A. Bowron, for the respondent.

Solicitors of Record:

Royal McCrum Duckett Glancy & Hatch, Edmonton, Alberta, for the appellant;

Attorney General of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, for the respondent.

This appeal was heard February 22, 2007, by McLachlin, C.J.C., Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada. The decision of the court was released in both official languages on June 7, 2007, with the following opinions:

Charron, J. (McLachlin, C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Fish and Rothstein, JJ., concurring) - see paragraphs 1 to 24;

Abella, J. (Bastarache and Deschamps, JJ., concurring), dissenting - see paragraphs 25 to 52.