R. v. Thompson et al., (1990) 114 N.R. 1 (SCC)

• Judge: Dickson, C.J.C., Lamer, C.J.C.*, McIntyre, Wilson, La Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé and Sopinka, JJ.
• Court: Supreme Court (Canada)
• Case Date: October 18, 1990
• Jurisdiction: Canada (Federal)
• Citations: (1990), 114 N.R. 1 (SCC);1990 CanLII 43 (SCC);74 DLR (4th) 61;[1990] SCJ No 104 (QL);EYB 1990-67822;49 BCLR (2d) 321;80 CR (3d) 129;29 RFL (3d) 337;[1990] 2 SCR 1111;59 CCC (3d) 225;JE 90-1502;[1990] 6 WWR 481;73 DLR (4th) 596;114 NR 1;[1990] SCJ No 107 (QL);[1990] RDF 660;[1990] ACS no 104;[1990] 2 SCR 1259;11 WCB (2d) 219;AZ-90111107;50 CRR 1;JE

R. v. Thompson (1990), 114 N.R. 1 (SCC)

MLB headnote and full text

[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

.........................

Perry Gordon Thompson, Ross Allen Rosen, Beebe Auld, Glen Douglas McDonald and James Cromwell (appellants) v. Her Majesty The Queen (respondent)

(No. 19992)

Indexed As: R. v. Thompson et al.

Supreme Court of Canada

Dickson, C.J.C., Lamer, C.J.C.*, McIntyre, Wilson, La Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé and Sopinka, JJ.

October 18, 1990.

Summary:

The accused were charged with conspiracy to import marijuana. The Crown's case consisted primarily of thirty-six intercepted communications. Following a voir dire the trial judge held that all but nine of the interceptions were inadmissible. The Crown called no evidence before the jury and the trial judge directed acquittals. The Crown appealed.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in a decision reported [1986] 5 W.W.R. 131; 33 D.L.R.(4th) 744; 29 C.C.C.(3d) 516; 53 C.R.(3d) 56, allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial. The accused appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada, Wilson and La Forest, JJ., dissenting, dismissed the appeal. The court affirmed the order for a new trial.

*Editor's Note: The Rt. Hon. Brian Dickson, C.J.C., qas the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada at the time of the hearing. The Rt. Hon. Antonio Lamer, C.J.C., was the Chief Justice at the time of judgment.

Civil Rights - Topic 1373

Security of the person - Police surveillance - Interception of private communications - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that electronic surveillance constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter - See paragraph 35.

Civil Rights - Topic 1373

Security of the person - Police surveillance - Interception of private communications - A wiretap authorization permitted interception of telephone communications at the accused's addresses or "elsewhere in the Province of British Columbia resorted to by the accused" (i.e., a "resort to" clause) - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the "resort to" clause was not per se contrary to the requirements of s. 8 of the Charter as laid down by the court in Southam Inc. v. Hunter (i.e., the requirement of prior authorization for a search and seizure) - See paragraphs 40 to 46.

Civil Rights - Topic 1373

Security of the person - Police surveillance - Interception of private communications - The Supreme Court of Canada held that interceptions of private conversations at pay telephones in the absence of reasonable and probable grounds for believing that the telephone was in use by a targeted person at the time the listening device was activated constituted an unreasonable search and seizure contrary to s. 8 of the Charter - See paragraphs 45 to 55, 75 - In the case at bar however the court held that evidence obtained contrary to s. 8 was admissible where it would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute - See paragraphs 76 to 79.

Civil Rights - Topic 8368

Charter - Denial of rights - Remedies - Exclusion of evidence - [See third Civil Rights - Topic 1373; first Criminal Law - Topic 5284; Criminal Law - Topic 5302].

Criminal Law - Topic 5273.1

Evidence and witnesses - Interception of private communications - Minimization - The Supreme Court of Canada discussed generally the notion of minimization (i.e., the idea that an authorization to intercept will be executed in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception) - See paragraphs 23 to 34 - The court also discussed minimization in relation to s. 8 of the Charter (the search and seizure provision) - See paragraphs 35 to 55.

Criminal Law - Topic 5282

Evidence and witnesses - Interception of private communications - Authority for - General - [See first Criminal Law - Topic 5285].

Criminal Law - Topic 5284

Evidence and witnesses - Interception of private communications - Authority for - Form and content - Re residential premises - The Supreme Court of Canada held that interceptions of private communications obtained by means of surreptitious entry into residential premises which were not specifically mentioned on the face of the authorization constituted an unreasonable search and seizure contrary to s. 8 of the Charter - See paragraphs 65 to 70 - In the case at bar however the court held that such evidence obtained contrary to s. 8 was admissible where its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute - See paragraphs 75 to 79.

Criminal Law - Topic 5284

Evidence and witnesses - Interception of private communications - Authority for - Form and content - [See Criminal Law - Topic 5286.1].

Criminal Law - Topic 5284.1

Evidence and witnesses - Interception of private communications - Authority for - "Resort to" clause - [See second Civil Rights - Topic 1373; Criminal Law - Topic

5297].

Criminal Law - Topic 5285

Evidence and witnesses - Interception of private communications - Authority for - Renewals - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "where an authorization is in existence and where it is desired to extend its term and leave its other provisions unaltered, an application for its renewal is the proper step for the authorities to take. Where the authorization has expired or where it is sought to extend the scope of surveillance, the proper course is to seek a new authorization" - See paragraph 63.

Criminal Law - Topic 5285

Evidence and witnesses - Interception of private communications - Authority for - Renewals - Police obtained a wiretap authorization - Subsequently they obtained two successive new authorizations, each overlapping the former somewhat - The new authorizations concerned the same persons and offences, but nine new targets for interception were added - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown properly applied for new authorizations, instead of renewals, where the second and third authorizations widened the scope of the first authorization - See paragraphs 56 to 63.

Criminal Law - Topic 5286.1

Evidence and witnesses - Interception of private communications - Authority for - Pay telephones - A wiretap authorization failed to mention that conversations would be intercepted from pay telephones - The Supreme Court of Canada held that this failure did not by itself render the authorization unlawful - See paragraphs 31 to 34.

Criminal Law - Topic 5295.2

Evidence and witnesses - Inadmissible private communications - Admissible interceptions - Pay telephones - [See third Civil Rights - Topic 1373].

Criminal Law - Topic 5295.3

Evidence and witnesses - Inadmissible private communications - Admissible interceptions - Under "resort to" clause - A wiretap authorization permitted interceptions of telephone communications at the addresses of the accused or "elsewhere in the Province of British Columbia resorted to by the accused" (i.e., a "resort to" clause) - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that under the "resort to" clause the police could only intercept communications of the accused at a place to which, based on evidence, they believed on reasonable and probable grounds, the target has resorted or will resort - The court thereafter discussed what evidence is required to prove "resorted to" - See paragraphs 41 to 44.

Criminal Law - Topic 5297

Evidence and witnesses - Inadmissible private communications - Admissible interceptions - "Lawfully made" - A wiretap authorization permitted interception of telephone communications at the accused's addresses or "elsewhere in the Province of British Columbia resorted to by the accused" (i.e., a "resort to" clause) - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the "resort to" clause was lawful within the meaning of s. 178.16 of the Criminal Code provided that the police acted upon sufficient evidence that a person "resorted to" a place - Interceptions at places for which such evidence is absent are unlawful and are subject to the absolute exclusionary rule of s. 178.16(1) and are therefore inadmissible - See paragraphs 23 to 75.

Criminal Law - Topic 5298

Evidence and witnesses - Inadmissible private communications - Admissible interceptions - Evidence and proof - [See Criminal Law - Topic 5297].

Criminal Law - Topic 5298

Evidence and witnesses - Inadmissible private communications - Admissible interceptions - Evidence and proof - [See Criminal Law - Topic 5295.3].

Criminal Law - Topic 5302

Evidence and witnesses - Inadmissible private communications - Inadmissible interceptions - Unlawful and unreasonable interceptions - The Supreme Court of Canada distinguished between wiretaps found to be unlawful for noncompliance with the Criminal Code and wiretaps that are unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter - An unlawful interception is subject to the rule of absolute exclusion under s. 178.16 of the Code, whereas unreasonable wiretaps are inadmissible only if their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute - See paragraphs 73, 74.

Cases Noticed:

R. v. Niles (1978), 40 C.C.C.(2d) 512 (Ont. C.A.), refd to. [paras. 11, 42].

R. v. Lyons, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 633; 80 N.R. 161, refd to. [paras. 12, 16, 24, 65, 66, 67, 78].

R. v. Grabowski, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 434; 63 N.R. 32, refd to. [paras. 14, 28, 29, 30, 125].

R. v. LeClerc (1985), 20 C.C.C.(3d) 173, refd to. [paras. 14, 29].

R. v. Finlay and Grellette (1985), 11 O.A.C. 279; 23 C.C.C.(3d) 48 (C.A.), refd to. [paras. 15, 36, 37, 38, 51, 109].

Interception of Private Communications Reference, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 697; 56 N.R. 43, refd to. [para. 16].

Dalia v. United States (1979), 441 U.S. 238, refd to. [paras. 16, 65, 66, 141].

R. v. Papalia, Monaco, Koaches, Carasin and Fisher (1984), 4 O.A.C. 79; 13 C.C.C.(3d) 449 (C.A.), refd to. [paras. 18, 128].

R. v. McLeod, [1988] N.W.T.R. 103 (N.W.T.C.A.), refd to. [para. 29].

R. v. Paterson, Ackworth and Kovach (1985), 7 O.A.C. 105; 18 C.C.C.(3d) 137 (C.A.), affd. [1987] 2 S.C.R. 291; 79 N.R. 316; 23 O.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 30].

R. v. Papalia, Monaco, Koaches, Carasin and Fisher, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 137; 87 N.R. 25; 29 O.A.C. 149, refd to. [paras. 32, 78, 127, 128, 132-136].

R. v. Sanelli, Duarte and Fasciano, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30; 103 N.R. 86, refd to. [paras. 35, 77, 107-110].

R. v. Wiggins, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62; 103 N.R. 118, refd to. [para. 35].

Southam Inc. v. Hunter, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; 55 N.R. 241; 55 A.R. 291; 9 C.R.R. 355; 14 C.C.C.(3d) 97; 41 C.R.(3d) 97; [1984] 6 W.W.R. 577; 33 Alta. L.R.(2d) 193; 27 B.L.R. 297; 84 D.T.C. 6467; 2 C.P.R.(3d) 1; 11 D.L.R.(4th) 641, refd to. [paras. 40, 45, 46, 85, 86, 109-113, 137, 138, 142].

Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, refd to. [para. 46].

Mead and Ford v. R. (No. 2) (1988), 72 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 33; 223 A.P.R. 33, refd to. [para. 47].

R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; [1987] 3 W.W.R. 699; 74 N.R. 276; 33 C.C.C.(3d) 1; 56 C.R.(3d) 193, refd to. [paras. 52, 76].

R. v. Badovinac (1977), 34 C.C.C.(2d) 65 (Ont. C.A.), refd to. [para. 58].

R. v. Pleich (1980), 16 C.R.(3d) 194 (Ont. C.A.), refd to. [paras. 59, 118].

R. v. Nicolucci and Papier (1985), 22 C.C.C.(3d) 207 (Qué. Sup. Ct.), affd.(1989), 29 Q.A.C. 174; 53 C.C.C.(3d) 546 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 60].

R. v. Vrany, Zikan and Dvorak (1979), 46 C.C.C.(2d) 14 (Ont. C.A.), refd to. [paras. 61, 122].

R. v. Dubois (1986), 13 O.A.C. 342; 27 C.C.C.(3d) 325 (C.A.), refd to. [paras. 61, 118].

R. v. Wilson, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 594; 51 N.R. 321; 26 Man.R.(2d) 155; 9 C.C.C.(3d) 97; [1984] 1 W.W.R. 481; 37 C.R.(3d) 97, refd to. [paras. 83-86, 99, 104, 127, 130, 139].

Davidson v. Slaight Communications Inc., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038; 93 N.R. 183, refd to. [paras. 87, 101, 136].

R. v. Playford (1987), 24 O.A.C. 161; 61 C.R.(3d) 101 (C.A.), refd to. [paras. 93, 108, 139].

R. v. Blacquiere (1980), 28 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 336; 79 A.P.R. 336; 57 C.C.C.(2d) 330 (P.E.I.S.C.), refd to. [para. 95].

R. v. Volpe (1981), 63 C.C.C.(2d) 506 (Ont. C.A.), refd to. [para. 122].

R. v. Meltzer and Laison, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1764; 96 N.R. 391, refd to. [para. 130].

R. v. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863; 67 N.R. 241; 16 O.A.C. 81; 52 C.R.(3d) 1; 26 C.C.C.(3d) 481; 29 D.L.R.(4th) 161, refd to. [para. 131].

R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588; 75 N.R. 81, refd to. [para. 131].

R. v. Chesson, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 148; 87 N.R. 115, refd to. [para. 134].

R. v. Landry, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 145; 65 N.R. 161, refd to. [para. 141].

Statutes Noticed:

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, sect. 1 [para. 55]; sect. 8 [para. 1 et seq.]; sect. 24(1) [para. 139]; sect. 24(2) [paras. 13, 39, 72, 77].

Constitution Act, 1982, sect. 52(1) [para. 139].

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, sect. 178(13)(1.1), sect. 178(13)(1.2) [para. 36]; sect. 178.11(2)(a) [para. 77]; sect. 178.12 [para. 16]; sect. 178.12(1) [para. 103]; sect. 178.12(1)(e) [paras. 25, 27, 93, 97, 128, 134]; sect. 178.13 [paras. 16, 45, 119]; sect. 178.13(1) [paras. 93, 101, 117, 118, 119, 140]; sect. 178.13(1)(a) [para. 119]; sect. 178.13(1)(b) [paras. 78, 119]; sect. 178.13(2) [paras. 81, 102]; sect. 178.13(2)(c) [paras. 18, 21, 25, 27, 28, 32, 87, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 102, 132]; sect. 178.13(2)(d) [paras. 24, 25, 36, 50, 53, 55, 68, 75]; sect. 178.13(2)(e) [para. 124]; sect. 178.13(3) [paras. 117, 121, 122, 123]; sect. 178.13(4) [paras. 117, 118, 119, 120]; sect. 178.15(1) [para. 94]; sect. 178.15(2) [para. 40]; sect. 178.16 [para. 143]; sect. 178.16(1) [paras. 8, 72, 74, 75, 77, 89]; sect. 618(2) [para. 2]; Part IV.1 [para. 1 et seq.].

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C.A., Title III, sect. 2518(5) [paras. 23, 36].

Protection of Privacy Act, S.C. 197374, c. 50, sect. 2 [para. 88].

United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment [para. 16].

Authors and Works Noticed:

Carr, James G., The Law of Electronic Surveillance (2nd Ed. 1986), pp. 2-20, 2-20.1, 2-28, 2-29 [para. 108]; 5-27, 5-28 [para. 23].

Rauf, M. Naeem, Recent Developments in Wire-tap Law (1989), 31 Crim. L.Q. 208, p. 216 [para. 24].

Watt, David, Law of Electronic Surveillance in Canada (1979), p. 141 [para. 121].

Counsel:

Sidney B. Simons, for the appellants, Thompson and Cromwell;

Barry L. Long, for the appellants, Rosen and McDonald;

Patrick A. Good, for the appellant, Auld;

S. David Frankel and Ian J. McKinnon, for the respondent.

Solicitors of Record:

Sidney B. Simons, Vancouver, British Columbia, for the appellants, Thompson and Cromwell;

McCrea, Paul & Long, Vancouver, British Columbia, for the appellants, Rosen and McDonald;

Patrick A. Good, Vancouver, British Columbia, for the appellant, Auld;

John C. Tait, Ottawa, Ontario, for the respondent.

This appeal was heard on November 29 and 30, 1988, before Dickson, C.J.C.,  Lamer, C.J.C., * McIntyre, Wilson, La Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé and Sopinka, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada. The decision of the court was delivered on October 18, 1990, in both official languages including the following opinions:

Sopinka, J. (Dickson, C.J.C., Lamer C.J.C., and L'Heureux-Dubé, J., concurring) - see paragraphs 1 to 79;

Wilson, J., dissenting - see paragraphs 80 to 89;

La Forest, J., dissenting - see paragraphs 90 to 144.

McIntyre, J., took no part in the judgment.