R. v. Trochym (S.J.), (2007) 357 N.R. 201 (SCC)

• Judge: McLachlin, C.J.C., Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein, JJ.
• Court: Supreme Court (Canada)
• Case Date: May 09, 2006
• Jurisdiction: Canada (Federal)
• Citations: (2007), 357 N.R. 201 (SCC);2007 SCC 6;[2007] ACS no 6;[2007] 1 SCR 239;JE 2007-279;216 CCC (3d) 225;EYB 2007-113047;221 OAC 281;357 NR 201;276 DLR (4th) 257;43 CR (6th) 217;[2007] SCJ No 6 (QL);71 WCB (2d) 895

R. v. Trochym (S.J.) (2007), 357 N.R. 201 (SCC)

MLB headnote and full text

[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

.........................

Temp. Cite: [2007] N.R. TBEd. FE.001

Stephen John Trochym (appellant) v. Her Majesty The Queen (respondent)

(30717; 2007 SCC 6; 2007 CSC 6)

Indexed As: R. v. Trochym (S.J.)

Supreme Court of Canada

McLachlin, C.J.C., Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein, JJ.

February 1, 2007.

Summary:

A jury convicted the accused of second degree murder. He was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment. The trial judge set the period of parole ineligibility at 10 years. The accused appealed his conviction on several grounds relating to the admissibility of evidence, the conduct of Crown counsel, and the trial judge's charge to the jury. The Crown appealed the sentence, seeking an increase in the period of parole ineligibility to 12-15 years.

The Ontario Court of Appeal, in a decision reported at 188 O.A.C. 330, dismissed both appeals. The accused applied for and was granted leave to appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada, Bastarache, Abella and Rothstein, JJ., dissenting, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial.

Barristers and Solicitors - Topic 1802

The prosecutor - Role of - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "Crown counsel are expected to present, fully and diligently, all the material facts that have evidentiary value, as well as all the proper inferences that may reasonably be drawn from those facts. However, it is not the Crown's function 'to persuade a jury to convict other than by reason' ... Rhetorical techniques that distort the fact-finding process, and misleading and highly prejudicial statements, have no place in a criminal prosecution." - See paragraph 78.

Criminal Law - Topic 22

Prosecution of crime - Function of the Crown prosecutor, Director of Public Prosecutions and Attorney General - [See Barristers and Solicitors - Topic 1802 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 4352.1

Procedure - Charge or directions - Jury or judge alone - Directions regarding similar fact evidence - The Crown alleged that the accused murdered his ex-girlfriend shortly after she broke up with him - At trial, the deceased's neighbour testified that she had heard someone banging on the victim's apartment door the night of the murder - Given the timing, this person was likely the murderer - In support of its theory that the person who banged on the door was the accused, the Crown called Oliphant, a former girlfriend of the accused - She testified that the accused had moved out of their apartment at the end of their seven year relationship when asked, but returned late that night, or early the next morning, and banged at her door, yelling profanities - The trial judge held that the evidence was "admissible to show a pattern of emotional involvement which, when followed by rejection, turns to violence - Or, to put it another way, specifically it is evidence that the Oliphant relationship can show a pattern of violent behaviour engaged in by the accused when rejected by a girlfriend following a serious relationship" - The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed - A single incident rarely evidenced a "pattern" - A pattern was observed only if it was assumed that it was in fact the accused who banged on the deceased's door the night of the murder - Moreover, banging on a door could not be characterized as "distinct" or "unique" conduct that was somehow identifiable with a particular accused - The fact that the accused had in the past knocked on an ex-girlfriend's door could not support the inference that he was the person who knocked on the door in this instance - On the identity issue, this evidence had little, if any, probative value and it was highly prejudicial, particularly given the way that the Crown used it in his closing statement - Further, the trial judge did not alleviate the prejudice, but instructed the jury that the similar facts showed "a pattern of violent behaviour engaged in by the accused when rejected by a girlfriend following a serious relationship" - There was no evidence that the accused had committed violent acts against Oliphant - See paragraphs 69 to 78.

Criminal Law - Topic 4953

Appeals - Indictable offences - New trials - Grounds - Admission of prejudicial evidence - [See Criminal Law - Topic 4352.1 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 5036

Appeals - Indictable offences - Dismissal of appeal if no prejudice, substantial wrong or miscarriage results - Burden on Crown - In Khan (S.C.C., 2001) two categories of errors were identified where the curative proviso of s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code could be applied: (1) "harmless errors" (errors of a minor nature having no impact on the verdict) and (2) serious errors which would justify a new trial, but for the fact that the evidence adduced was so overwhelming that there was no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice - The proviso was applicable only if the evidence was so overwhelming that a conviction was inevitable, or would invariably result - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the standard for this second category should not be equated with the ordinary standard in a criminal trial of proof beyond a reasonable doubt - This higher standard reflected the fact that it was difficult for an appellate court, in particular when considering a jury trial, since no detailed findings of fact would have been made, to consider retroactively the effect that, for example, excluding certain evidence could reasonably have had on the outcome - See paragraphs 80 to 82.

Criminal Law - Topic 5209

Evidence and witnesses - Admissibility and relevancy - Prejudicial evidence - [See Criminal Law - Topic 4352.1 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 5213

Evidence and witnesses - Admissibility and relevancy - Similar acts - When admissible - [See Criminal Law - Topic 4352.1 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 5214.1

Evidence and witnesses - Admissibility and relevancy - Similar acts - To prove identity of accused - [See Criminal Law - Topic 4352.1 ].

Evidence - Topic 1259

Relevant facts - Relevance and materiality - Similar acts - To prove identity - [See Criminal Law - Topic 4352.1 ].

Evidence - Topic 7591

Competency of evidence - Hypnotically induced evidence - The Supreme Court of Canada applied its decision in R. v. J.-L.J. (2000) to the issue of post-hypnotic testimony - The court, in summary, stated that "it is evident, based on the scientific evidence on record, that post-hypnosis testimony does not satisfy the test for admissibility set out in J.-L.J. While hypnosis has been the subject of extensive study and peer review, much of the literature is inconclusive or highly contradictory regarding the reliability of the science in the judicial context. Unless a litigant reverses the presumption on the basis of the factors set out in J.-L.J., post-hypnosis testimony should not be admitted in evidence." - See paragraphs 24 to 61.

Evidence - Topic 7591

Competency of evidence - Hypnotically induced evidence - The Supreme Court of Canada held that post-hypnosis testimony should not be admitted in evidence - See paragraphs 24 to 61 - Further, "A trial judge may have to rule on a request to allow a witness to testify on topics in respect of which questions were not asked during the hypnosis session -  The judge must then balance the risks inherent in the use of hypnosis against the search for truth. Although this testimony may be tainted by post-hypnosis memories and although the cross-examination of the witness may be impaired, the judge may be satisfied that the detrimental effects are outweighed by the probative value of the testimony. In such a case, the trial judge may consider it appropriate to allow evidence on topics that were not touched on during the hypnosis session to be put to the jury. However, if the judge considers that the evidence is so important that it has to be put to the jurors despite its potential shortcomings, those shortcomings have to be mentioned. The judge must then give proper instructions to the jury concerning the effect of hypnosis on the weight of the testimony. The rationale for requiring specific instructions even though a topic was not touched on in the session is that the impact of hypnosis on testimony is not limited to post-hypnosis recollection and that testimony on the topic in question is accordingly likely to affect the jury's assessment of the witness's testimony." - See paragraph 64.

Evidence - Topic 7591

Competency of evidence - Hypnotically induced evidence - The Supreme Court of Canada held that post-hypnosis testimony should not be admitted in evidence - See paragraphs 24 to 61 - Further, a trial judge should not admit evidence on topics covered during a hypnosis session even if the witness did not change his or her testimony while under hypnosis - The court stated that "it would be inconsistent with the inadmissibility rule to allow those parts of the testimony, since they are tainted by the inherent shortcomings of the technique of hypnosis. Moreover, it would seem risky to take it for granted that the testimony at trial will be limited to pre-hypnosis memories. Indeed, the possibility that examination or cross-examination at trial will prompt answers more detailed than the recorded pre-hypnosis memories should not be underestimated. ... in addition to concerns about memory hardening and the impairment of cross-examination, there is also the possibility that a witness will recall additional details whose accuracy is suspect. The overriding problem is that testimony on topics covered in a hypnosis session will be tainted. It will not cease to be tainted merely because it is consistent with a pre-hypnosis statement. Indeed, as Professor Shaw states ... 'Determining the extent of the witness's prehypnotic recollection as well as the extent to which memory hardening has occurred may be difficult to ascertain with precision'." - See paragraphs 65 and 66.

Cases Noticed:

United States of America v. Burns and Rafay, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; 265 N.R. 212; 148 B.C.A.C. 1; 243 W.A.C. 1; 2001 SCC 7, refd to. [para. 1].

R. v. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600; 261 N.R. 111; 2000 SCC 51, appld. [paras. 13, 131].

R. v. Clark (1984), 55 A.R. 193; 13 C.C.C.(3d) 117 (Q.B.), overruled [paras. 20, 125].

State v. Hurd (1980), 414 A.2d 291 (N.J. Sup. Ct.), refd to. [para. 26].

People v. McDowell (1980), 427 N.Y.S.2d 181 (S.C.), refd to. [para. 26].

R. v. Bernier, [2004] Q.J. No. 11567 (Sup. Ct.), refd to. [para. 26].

R. v. Sanchez-Flores, [1993] O.J. No. 4161 (Gen. Div.), refd to. [paras. 26, 134].

R. v. O'Brien (J.A.) (1992), 117 N.S.R.(2d) 48; 324 A.P.R. 48 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 26].

R. v. Savoy (C.), [1997] B.C.T.C. Uned. H49; [1997] B.C.J. No. 2747 (S.C.), refd to. [paras. 26, 134].

R. v. Taillefer and Duguay (1995), 100 C.C.C.(3d) 1 (Que. C.A.), refd to. [paras. 28, 134].

R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9; 166 N.R. 245; 71 O.A.C. 241, refd to. [paras. 28, 138].

Burral v. State (1999), 724 A.2d 65 (MD), refd to. [para. 29].

State v. Moore (2006), 902 A.2d 1212 (N.J.), refd to. [para. 29].

R. v. Terceira (J.) (1998), 107 O.A.C. 15; 38 O.R.(3d) 175 (C.A.), affd. [1999] 3 S.C.R. 866; 250 N.R. 98; 129 O.A.C. 283, refd to. [paras. 32, 134].

R. v. Hibbert (K.R.), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 445; 287 N.R. 111; 165 B.C.A.C. 161; 270 W.A.C. 161; 2002 SCC 39, refd to. [paras. 32, 172].

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. (1993), 509 U.S. 579, refd to. [paras. 36, 139].

R. v. McFelin, [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 750 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 47].

R. v. G., [1996] 1 N.Z.L.R. 615 (H.C.), refd to. [para. 47].

R. v. Haywood (1994), 73 A. Crim. R. 41 (S.C. Tasmania), refd to. [para. 47].

Harding v. State (1968), 246 A.2d 302 (MD), refd to. [para. 48].

People v. Shirley (1982), 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. S.C.), refd to. [para. 49].

Rock v. Arkansas (1987), 483 U.S. 44 (S.C.), refd to. [paras. 50, 155].

R. v. Seaboyer and Gayme, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577; 128 N.R. 81; 48 O.A.C. 81, refd to. [paras. 54, 176].

R. v. Baltovich (R.) (2004), 192 O.A.C. 366; 73 O.R.(3d) 481 (C.A.), refd to. [paras. 57, 134].

R. v. Béland and Phillips, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 398; 79 N.R. 263; 9 Q.A.C. 293, refd to. [para. 62].

R. v. Arp (B.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 339; 232 N.R. 317; 114 B.C.A.C. 1; 186 W.A.C. 1, refd to. [paras. 71, 186].

R. v. Handy (J.), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908; 290 N.R. 1; 160 O.A.C. 201; 164 C.C.C.(3d) 481; 213 D.L.R.(4th) 385; 2002 SCC 56, refd to. [paras. 71, 186].

R. v. C.R.B., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 717; 107 N.R. 241; 109 A.R. 81; 55 C.C.C.(3d) 1, refd to. [para. 72].

Boucher v. R., [1955] S.C.R. 16, refd to. [para. 79].

R. v. Proctor (1992), 75 Man.R.(2d) 217; 6 W.A.C. 217; 11 C.R.(4th) 200 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 79].

R. v. Khan (M.A.), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 823; 279 N.R. 79; 160 Man.R.(2d) 161; 262 W.A.C. 161; 2001 SCC 86, refd to. [paras. 81, 191].

R. v. P.L.S., [1991] 1 S.C.R. 909; 122 N.R. 321; 90 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 234; 280 A.P.R. 234, refd to. [para. 81].

R. v. White (R.G.) and Côté (Y.), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 72; 227 N.R. 326; 112 O.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 108].

R. v. D.O.L., [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419; 161 N.R. 1; 88 Man.R.(2d) 241; 51 W.A.C. 241, refd to. [para. 111].

Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209; 292 N.R. 296; 312 A.R. 201; 281 W.A.C. 201; 164 O.A.C. 280; 217 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 183; 651 A.P.R. 183; 2002 SCC 61, refd to. [para. 112].

H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General) et al., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401; 333 N.R. 1; 262 Sask.R. 1; 347 W.A.C. 1; 2005 SCC 25, refd to. [para. 113].

R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670; 85 N.R. 81, refd to. [para. 114].

R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933; 125 N.R. 1; 47 O.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 114].

R. v. Pitt, [1968] 3 C.C.C. 342 (B.C.S.C.), refd to. [para. 132].

R. v. K., [1979] 5 W.W.R. 105 (Man. Prov. Ct.), refd to. [para. 132].

R. v. Horvath, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 376; 25 N.R. 537, refd to. [para. 132].

State v. Brown (1983), 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D.), refd to. [para. 134].

State v. Jorgensen (1971), 492 P.2d 312 (Or. Ct. App.), refd to. [para. 134].

State v. Glebock (1981), 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Crim. App.), refd to. [para. 134].

Prime v. State (1989), 767 P.2d 149 (Wyo.), refd to. [para. 134].

R. v. Zubot (1981), 47 A.R. 389 (Q.B.), refd to. [para. 134].

R. v. Hart, [1990] O.J. No. 2678 (H.C.), refd to. [para. 134].

R. v. Gauld, [1994] O.J. No. 1477 (Gen. Div.), refd to. [para. 134].

R. v. A.B. (2004), 27 C.R.(6th) 283 (C.Q.), refd to. [para. 134].

R. v. Medvedew (1978), 43 C.C.C.(2d) 434 (Man. C.A.), refd to. [para. 138].

R. v. Neilsen and Stolar (1984), 30 Man.R.(2d) 81; 16 C.C.C.(3d) 39 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 138].

R. v. Melaragni (1992), 73 C.C.C.(3d) 348 (Ont. Gen. Div.), refd to. [para. 138].

R. v. Johnston (1992), 69 C.C.C.(3d) 395 (Ont. Gen. Div.), refd to. [para. 138].

R. v. R.A.D. (1993), 25 B.C.A.C. 206; 43 W.A.C. 206; 80 C.C.C.(3d) 97 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 138].

R. v. J.E.T., [1994] O.J. No. 3067 (Gen. Div.), refd to. [para. 138].

R. v. McIntosh (O.) (1997), 102 O.A.C. 210; 117 C.C.C.(3d) 385 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 138].

Frye v. United States (1923), 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.), refd to. [para. 140].

State v. Moore (2004), 852 A.2d 1073, refd to. [para. 141].

R. v. Find (K.), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863; 269 N.R. 149; 146 O.A.C. 236; 2001 SCC 32,  refd to. [para. 142].

R. v. D.D., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275; 259 N.R. 156; 136 O.A.C. 201; 2000 SCC 43, refd to. [para. 143].

R. v. Sappier (D.M.) et al. (2006), 355 N.R. 1;  309 N.B.R.(2d) 199; 799 A.P.R. 199; 2006 SCC 54, refd to. [para. 143].

R. v. Fliss (P.W.), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 535; 283 N.R. 120; 163 B.C.A.C. 1; 267 W.A.C. 1; 2002 SCC 16, refd to. [para. 146].

R. v. Meddoui, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 289; 111 A.R. 295; 61 C.C.C.(3d) 345 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 146].

R. v. Holmes (1989), 99 A.R. 106 (Q.B.), refd to. [para. 154].

R. v. S.C.B. (1997), 104 O.A.C. 81; 36 O.R.(3d) 516 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 161].

R. v. Peavoy (D.M.) (1997), 101 O.A.C. 304; 117 C.C.C.(3d) 226 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 162].

R. v. Ménard (S.), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 109; 228 N.R. 100; 111 O.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 162].

R. v. Arcangioli (G.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 129; 162 N.R. 280; 69 O.A.C. 26, refd to. [para. 163].

R. v. Levert (G.) (2001), 150 O.A.C. 208; 159 C.C.C.(3d) 71 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 164].

R. v. Bennett (M.) (2003), 177 O.A.C. 71; 179 C.C.C.(3d) 244 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 164].

R. v. A.S. (2004), 192 O.A.C. 85; 190 C.C.C.(3d) 496 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 164].

R. v. Turcotte (T.), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 519; 339 N.R. 32; 216 B.C.A.C. 1; 356 W.A.C. 1; 2005 SCC 50, refd to. [para. 168].

R. v. Rothman, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640; 35 N.R. 485; 59 C.C.C.(2d) 30, refd to. [para. 170].

R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151; 110 N.R. 1, refd to. [para. 170].

R. v. Lyttle (M.G.), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193; 316 N.R. 52; 184 O.A.C. 1; 2004 SCC 5, refd to. [para. 176].

R. v. R. (1994), 74 O.A.C. 363; 94 C.C.C.(3d) 168 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 177].

Markadonis v. R., [1935] S.C.R. 657; 64 C.C.C. 41, refd to. [para.181].

R. v. Yakeleya (1985), 9 O.A.C. 284; 46 C.R.(3d) 282 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 181].

R. v. W.J.M. (1995), 82 O.A.C. 130 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 181].

R. v. K.M.E. (2003), 178 B.C.A.C. 199; 292 W.A.C. 199; 172 C.C.C.(3d) 28; 2003 BCCA 68, refd to. [para. 181].

R. v. White (I.) (1999), 117 O.A.C. 246; 132 C.C.C.(3d) 373 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 181].

R. v. Rose (J.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262; 232 N.R. 83; 115 O.A.C. 201, refd to. [para. 183].

R. v. M.B.P., [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555; 165 N.R. 321; 70 O.A.C. 161, refd to. [para. 183].

R. v. Bevan and Griffith, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 599; 154 N.R. 245; 64 O.A.C. 165, refd to. [para. 190].

R. v. Charlebois (P.), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 674; 261 N.R. 239; 148 C.C.C.(3d) 449; 2000 SCC 53, refd to. [para. 190].

Statutes Noticed:

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, sect. 686(1)(b)(iii) [para. 80].

Authors and Works Noticed:

Akhtar, Suhail, Improprieties in Cross-Examination (2004), 15 C.R.(6th) 236, generally [para. 181].

Bubela, Tania M., Expert Evidence: The Ethical Responsibility of the Legal Profession (2003-2004), 41 Alta. L. Rev. 853, p. 854 [para. 143].

Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis (1985), 253 J.A.M.A. 1918, generally  [para. 39].

Diamond, Bernard L., Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness (1980), 68 Cal. L. Rev. 313, generally [para. 39].

Evans, K. Barrie, Hypnotically Induced Testimony: Implications for Criminal Law in New Zealand, [1994] N.Z.L.J. 348, generally [para. 39].

Faigman, David L., Kaye, David, Saks, Michael, and Sanders, Joseph, Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony (2005), vol. 1, p. 9 [para. 140].

Fleming, Thomas M., Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed or Enhanced Testimony (1990 & 2006 Supp.), 77 A.L.R.(4th) 927, generally [para. 39].

Frater, Robert J., The Seven Deadly Prosecutorial Sins (2002), 7 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 209, p. 213 [para. 184].

Harsel, Justin, The Use of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony in Criminal Trials (1996), 20 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 897, generally [para. 29].

Manitoba, Department of Justice, The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow: The Investigation, Prosecution and Consideration of Entitlement to Compensation (Sophonow Report) (2001), pp. 33, 34 [para. 46].

McWilliams, Peter K., Canadian Criminal Evidence (4th Ed. 2003) (2006 Looseleaf Update, Release 5), vol. 1, pp. 12 to 34 [para. 139].

Orne, Martin T., The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court (1979), 27 Int'l J. Clinicial and Experimental Hypnosis 311, generally [para. 39].

Orne, Martin T., et al., Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony: Enhanced Memory or Tampering with Evidence?, in Issues and Practices in Criminal Justice (1985), pp. 5 to 27 [para. 39].

Perell, Paul M., Proof of an Event of which a Witness Has No Memory (2003), 26 Adv. Q. 95, pp. 100, 101 [para. 154].

Shaw, Gary M., The Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony in Criminal Trials (1991), 75 Marq. L. Rev. 1, generally [para. 39]; pp. 12 [para. 44]; 76 [para. 66].

Sophonow Report - see Manitoba, Department of Justice, The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow: The Investigation, Prosecution and Consideration of Entitlement to Compensation.

Stewart, Hamish, Evidence: A Canadian Casebook (2002), pp. 78 [para. 146]; 128 [para. 111].

Wagstaff, Graham F., Hypnosis and the Law: A Critical Review of Some Recent Proposals, [1983] Crim. L. Rev. 152, generally [para. 39].

Webert, Daniel, R., Are the Courts in a Trance? Approaches to the Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Witness Testimony in Light of Empirical Evidence (2003), 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1301, generally [para. 39].

Counsel:

James Lockyer and C. Anik Morrow, for the appellant;

Kenneth L. Campbell and Howard Leibovich, for the respondent.

Solicitors of Record:

Lockyer Campbell Posner, Toronto, Ontario, for the appellant;

Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, for the respondent.

This appeal was heard on May 9, 2006, by McLachlin, C.J.C., Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada. The court delivered its decision in both official languages on February 1, 2007, when the following opinions were filed:

Deschamps, J. (McLachlin, C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel and Fish, JJ., concurring) - see paragraphs 1 to 84;

Charron, J. - see paragraphs 85 to 90;

Bastarache, J., dissenting (Abella and Rothstein, JJ., concurring) - see paragraphs 91 to 192.