The Concept of Security Interest and Scope of the Personal Property Security Act

AuthorRonald C.C. Cuming/Catherine Walsh/Roderick J. Wood
ProfessionUniversity of Saskatchewan, College of Law/McGill University, Faculty of Law/University of Alberta, Faculty of Law
Pages58-117
CHAP TER 2
THE CONCEPT OF
SECURITY INTEREST
AND SCOPE OF THE
PER SONAL PROPERT Y
SECUR IT Y ACT
A. THE DEFINITION AND CENTR AL
CONCEPT OF SECURITY INTEREST
1) A Unitary Concept
The concept of security interest is at the core of the PPSA.1 The Act ap-
plies only to transactions that cre ate or provide for securit y interests or
that are deemed to create secur ity interests.2 In the context of the PPSA
itself, there is no need to determi ne the nature of a security interest
other than to recogni ze that it is an interest that gives to the secured
party the rights against speci f‌ied kinds of competing cla imants and
1 Issues rel ating to the creation of a secu rity interest, includi ng questions of
rights in t he collateral and attachme nt, are dealt with in chapte r 3.
2 It is clear th at a security agreement is a ne cessary but not suff‌icient c ondition
for the creation of a se curity interest. Al l of the statutory prerequis ites for its
creation must be met : an agreement through which it i s recognized that the
secured par ty has or is to have a “secu rity interest,” the givin g of value by the
secured par ty, and the holding or acquisition of r ights in the collateral by t he
debtor. A security int erest is created by a secur ity agreement only in the se nse
that a secur ity agreement is a sine qua n on of the existence of a secur ity interest.
The making of a sec urity agreement by the pa rties provides the legal ly relevant
evidence of thei r intentions that one part y is to have a security i nterest in
property of the ot her. Once the existence of this e vidence coincides with the
existence of t he other prerequisites, the se curity interest attac hes.
58
Concept of Secur ity Interest and Scope of the Personal Property Security Act 59
against the debtor that are set out in the Act. However, it is relevant in
other contexts to identify the central concept of the PPSA.3 Most pre-
PPSA forms of security agreements used in Canada involved transfers
of legal or equitable title.4 The PPSA makes it clear that this is not
required or even relevant.5 Many security interests are created under
transact ions that provide for nothing more th an the recognition that
the secured part y has a security interest in identif‌ied p ersonal property
of the debtor. However, when the rights of a secured party or debtor
come into conf‌lict with those of a third-party claimant in a context not
regulated by the PPSA, it may be necess ary to determine the nature of a
security interest i n order to determine the outcome of the conf‌lict.
Not all security interests falling w ithin the scope of the Act are
conceptually the same. This i s a product of several factors examined
later in this chapter. The term “security interest” is def‌ined in the Act
as “an interest in personal property that secure s payment or perform-
ance of an obligation.”6 This def‌inition must be read in the context of
the scope section of the Act that prov ides that the Act applies “to every
transaction that in substance creates a s ecurity interest …” and that
provides a non-exclusive list of transactions that are to be tre ated as
creating or providing for security interests.7
3 The authors do not agree th at the approach described b y Professor Grant
Gilmore, one of the arch itects of Article 9, applies to t he PPSA. Professor Gil-
more concluded that the de f‌inition of “security int erest” in UCC § 1-201(37)
is “essenti ally a declaration of fait h.… What is important to rememb er is that,
ultimately, the Ar ticle 9 security intere st f‌loats, unmoored, in a void. Whether
any partic ular transaction c reates ‘an interest … which se cures … an obligation’
is a question for judic ial determination.” See G. Gilm ore, Security Interests in
Personal Property, vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965) at 334–35.
4 There are circum stances in which it remai ns important to use tr aditional forms
of charging c lauses in agreements. O f particular import ance in this respe ct are
title retention cl auses in secured sale s agreements. See, for example, s. 89(1)
of the Indian Act, R. S.C. 1985, c. I-5 (re-en. 1988, c. 23, s. 12) which provides
different r ights depending upon whether th e security agreement is a c onditional
sales contra ct or another type of secur ity agreement. See als o chapter 14, A.7.a
“The Bank Act Priority Provisions.”
5 PPSA (A, M, NB, PEI, S) s. 3(1); (BC, NWT, Nu) s. 2(1); (NL, NS) s. 4(1); O s. 2(a);
Y s. 2.
6 PPSA (A, BC, NWT, Nu, O, Y) s. 1(1); (M, NB, PEI) s. 1; (NL, NS) s. 2; S s. 2(1).
7 Above note 5. The def‌inition and t he scope section are tied toget her in the
def‌inition of sec urity agreement — “an agreeme nt that creates or provides for a
securit y interest.” PPSA (A, BC, NWT, Nu, O, Y) s. 1(1); (M, NB, PEI) s. 1; (NL,
NS) s. 2; S s. 2(1).
PERSO NAL PR OPERTY SEC URI TY LAW60
2) Hypothecation
Standing alone, the def‌inition of security interest is both too broad and
too narrow to def‌ine accurately t he concept in the Act. It is too nar-
row in that it does not descr ibe common law interests ar ising under
transact ions such as conditional sales contracts and s ecurity leases that
are within the scope of the Act. It is too broad in that it can be read as
applying to non-consensual security interest s that are not within the
scope of the Act.8 However, it does describe the central concept that
characterizes the great bulk of interests to which the Act applies.
This central concept has the followi ng features.9 It assumes that
the debtor has or will acquire a proper ty interest in pers onal property.
By agreement between the debtor and the creditor,10 that interest is
charged or is to be charged with or encumbered by an interest granted
in favour of the creditor11 for the purposes of securing performance of
an obligation of a debtor.12 This concept is not new — it was a feature
of Roman law (hypothec)13 and was recognized in Equity (equitable
8 The Act applies only to inte rests arising under a c onsensual arra ngement (con-
tract) and those t hat are given by the PPSA it self. Except to the extent th at it
provides a prior ity rule for repairers’ lien s, it does not apply to interest that ar ise
by operation of law. See Can adian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. 64576 Manitoba
Ltd. (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 308 (Man. Q.B.), aff’d (1991), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 4 (C.A.).
The Ontario PPS A is an exception to this gener alization. See s. 20(1)(a)(i).
9 The conceptualiz ation of a security intere st under the Act applies only to
transac tions that function as s ecured f‌inancing ar rangements (above note 5),
not to those that do not b ut are deemed to be security ag reements in order to
bring them w ithin the publication and pr iority regimes of the Act (see PPS A (A,
M, NB, PEI, S) s. 3(2); (NL, NS) s. 4(2); (NWT, Nu) s. 2(2); (O, Y) s. 2(b); BC s.
3). The common law characteri stics of these tran sactions remain undi sturbed
except to the ver y limited extent it is neces sary to deem them to have ch aracter-
istics of sec urity agreements for cle arly limited purpose s.
10 The term “creditor” is u sed although the obligation sec ured need not be a debt.
A securit y interest can secure pay ment or performance of any obli gation.
11 The interest can b e one that is recognized i n law or equity. Consequently, a con-
tractual e quitable assignment (i.e., an agreement t o assign or transfer a fut ure
chose-in-action) is a s ecurity agreement th at gives rise to a secur ity interest as
soon as the debtor acqui res a property interest in t he property described i n the
agreement. See 356447 British Columbia Ltd. v. Canadia n Imperial Bank of Com-
merce, [1998] 9 W.W.R. 59 (B.C.C.A.).
12 The transaction may involve two “debtors”: a principal debtor and a guarantor.
See the def‌init ion of debtor: PPSA (A, BC, NWT, Nu, O, Y) s. 1(1); (M, NB, PEI)
s. 1; (NL, NS) s. 2; S s. 2(1).
13 See P. Van Warmelo, An Introduction to the Princ iples of Roman Civil Law (Cape
Town: Juta, 1976) at 116–19.

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