Definitions of 'child of the marriage'; adult children; obligation of de facto parent

• Author: Julien D. Payne/Marilyn A. Payne
• Pages: 40-116

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   

DEFINITIONS OF “CHILD OF THE

MARRIAGE”; ADULT CHILDREN;

OBLIGATION OF DE FACTO PARE NT

A. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

e def‌initions of “chi ld of the marr iage” in sect ions () and () of the Divorce Actread

as follows:

Def‌initions

.()InthisAct,

...

“childof the marriage”means a child of twospouses or formerspouses who,at the material

time,

(a) isundertheageofmajorityandwhohasnotwithdrawnfromtheircharge,or

(b) is the age of majority or over and under their charge but unable, by reason of illness,

disabilityorothercause,towithdrawfromtheirchargeortoobtainthenecessariesof

life.

...

Child of the marriage

()For the purposesof the def‌inition“childof the marriage” in subsection (), a child of

two spouses or former spousesi ncludes:

(a) anychildforwhomtheybothstandintheplaceofparents;and

(b) anychildofwhomoneistheparentandforwhomtheotherstandsintheplaceofa

parent.

Achildisusuallyconsideredtohavewithdrawnfromparentalchargewhenhehas

suf‌f‌icient income to meet h is own f‌inancial needs.e phrase “at the materia l time” in the

def‌initionof“childofthemarriage”undersection()oftheDivorce Act does not refer to

whetherapersonstandsintheplaceofaparentwithinthemeaningofthedef‌initionof

 R.S.C.(dSupp.),c.,asamendedbyR.S.C.(dSupp.),c.,S.C.,c.,S.C.,c.,S.C.R.S.C.  (d Supp.), c. , as amended by R. S.C.  (d Supp.),c. , S.C. , c. , S.C. , c. , S.C .

,c..

A.W.H. v. C.G.S.,[] N.S.J. No.  (Q.B.).

Definition s of “Child of the Marriage”; Adu lt Children; Obligation of De Facto Pare nt 

“child of the marr iage” under sect ion () of the Divorce Act.Itonlyreferstotheprerequi-

site of an application for ch ild support that the child mus t be under the age of majorit y or

must be older and sti ll f‌inancially dependent on t he parents at the ti me the application i s

brought. e proper ti me for determin ing whether a person stands i n the place of a parent

within the meaning of the def‌inition of “child of the marriage” under section () of the

Divorce Act is during the marriage when the family functioned as a unit.

Section()oftheDivorce Act, above, def‌ines a “child of the marriage” and deals with

the entitlement to support. e Fed eral Child Support Guidelines do not dea l with entitle-

ment;theyonlydealwiththeamountofsupport.



For the purpose of apply ing the def‌i nition of “child of the m arriage” i n section () of

the Divorce Act,theageofmajorityinrespectofachildmeanstheageofmajorityasde-

termined by the laws of a province where the child resides, or, if the child residesoutside of

Canada,eighteenyearsofage.

It appears that a ny child under t he provincia l age of major-

ity satisf‌ie s the def‌init ion of “child of the marr iage” under sect ion () of the Divorce Act,

if that child i s in fact f‌in anciall y dependent on his or her parents. e ch ild’s capacit y to

withdrawfrom their parents’ charge andunwillingness to do so appears to be irrelevant to

the statutory def‌inition. Child ren under the provincial age of m ajority who are f‌inancia lly

dependent while they cont inue with thei r schooling sat isfy the de f‌inition of “child ren of

the marriage” under section () of the Divorce Act eventhough they are alienated from the

non-custodial parent who is called upon to pay child support.

Adivorcingordivorcedspousemaybeorderedtopaysupportinrespectofanadult

child who is unable to achieve self-suf‌f‌iciency by reason of “illness, disability, or other

cause.”epursuitofpost-secondaryeducationconstitutes“othercause.”

An adult child

whoisenrolledasafull-timestudentinhighschoolmaybefoundtobea“childofthemar-

riage” within the meaning of section () of the Divorce Act, notwithstanding a “spotty”

academic record and pr ior poor attendanc e record, where the chi ld is cur rently maint ain-

ingapassingaverage.



 Chartier v. Chartier, []  S.C.R. .

Sherlow v. Zubko,[]A.J.No. (Q.B.).

 Divorce Act,s.()(def‌initionof“ageofmajority”);seeBoisvert v. Boisvert,[]A.J.No. (Q.B.);

O’Connell v. McIndoe,[]B.C.J.No.(S.C.);Longhurst v. Longhurst,[]B.C.J.No. (S.C.).

 Bois vert v. Boisvert,ibid.;Manchur v. Manchur,[]B.C.J.No. (S.C.);Longhurst v. Longhurst,

ibid.;Vishlof‌f v. Vishlof‌f,[]B.C.J.No. (S.C.);Fost er v. Foster,[]B.C.J.No.(S.C.);G.R.

v. T.R .,[]B.C.J.No.(S.C.);Willock v. Willock, []B.C .J. No.  (S.C.); J.A.H. v. R.H.,[]

B.C.J. No.  (S.C.); Lange v. van Berckel, [] B.C.J. No.  (S.C.); ompson v. Ducharme,[]

M.J. No.  (C.A.); Marshall v. Marshall,[]N.S.J.No. (S.C.);Frim v. Brasseur,[]O.J.No.

 (S.C.J.); Pittrof‌f v. Pittrof‌f, [] S.J. No.  (Q.B.); Garinger v. ompson, [] S.J. No.  (Q.B.);

Wout ers v. Wo uter s,  NWTSC , [] N.W.T.J. No. . Compare Wigmore v. Wigmore,[]

P.E.I.J. No.  (T.D.); Ladissa v. Ladissa,[]O.J.No.(C.A.). SeealsoT.L.M. v. M.J.M.,[] B.C.J.

No.  (S.C.) (application under Family Relations Act); Ames v. Ames, [] B.C.J. No.  (S.C.).

 Marsh v. Marsh,[]B.C.J.No.(C.A.).

 Divorc e Act,s.()(def‌initionof“childofthemarriage”);Rebenchu k v. Rebenchuk,  MBCA ; Sher-

low v. Zubko,[]A.J.No. (Q.B.).

 Sherl ow v. Zubko,ibid.;McArthur v. McArthur, []A.J. No.  (Q.B.); Rebenchuk v. Rebenchuk,

MBCA ; Hawko v. Myers,[]N.J.No.  (C.A.);MacLennan v. MacLennan, [] N.S.J. No. 

(C.A .); Cusack v. Cusack,[]P.E.I.J.No.  (S.C.);see SectionE,belowinthischapter.

 P.G.B . v. J. L.T., [] A.J. No.  (Q.B.).

 CHILD SUPPORT GUIDE LINES IN CANADA, 

Adivorcingordivorcedspousecanbeorderedtopaychildsupporteventhoughheor

she is not the biologica l parent of the chi ld, if he or she has acte d as a parent toward s the

child.

Acourtmaydirectthetrialofanissueastowhetherachildfallswithinthedef‌inition

ofa“childofthemarriage”whereexistingaf‌f‌idavitmaterialisinsuf‌f‌icienttoresolvethe

issue.

Pursuant to se ction  of the A lberta Family Law Act, a child supp ort order is term i-

natedbytheadoptionofthechildbutthisdoesnotaf‌fectarrearsofchildsupportthat

accrued prior to such termination . A step-parenta l adoption termi nates the ties between

the child a nd his biologica l father and precludes a n order for child suppor t being made

against t he biological fat her. echildsupportobligationsofanadoptiveparentin Sas-

katchewancorrespondtotheobligationsofanaturalparent.

 e child support obliga-

tion of a non-custod ial biologica l parent arisi ng pursuant to e Family Maintenance Act

(Saskatchewan)doesnotsurvivetheadoptionofthechildbyathirdparty.esameistrue

wherethe biological parent’ssupport obligation arosepursuant to the Divorce Act.efact

that provinci al adoption legi slation termi nates right s under the Divorce Act does not raise

anyconcernsunderthedoctrineofparamountcy.



B. EFFECT OF DIFFERING CRITERIA UNDER FEDERAL AND

PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION

e fact that dif‌ferent age cut-of‌fs and standards apply to the statutory regulation of child

support under feder al and provincial leg islation does not violate sec tion  of the Canadian

Charter of Rights and Freedom s.

e Divorce Act and the Family Relations Act (B.C.) establish dif‌ferent legal c riteria for

determini ng whether a step-parent is liable for chi ld support. e respondent’s assumption

of a parenting role and h is payment of chi ld support to the mot her for several years based

on an erroneous belief that he is the father of the childwill not trigger the impositionof an

obligation to support the child under the Family Relati ons Act (B.C.),ifthepayorwasnever

marriedtothemotherandtheydidnotliveinamarriage-likerelationshipforatleasttwo

years,whichisarequirementunderthedef‌initionof“parent”insection()oftheFami ly

Relations Act (B.C.).

As of December , , the Fam ily Se rvi ces Act of New Bru nswick was amended to

empoweracourttoorderinterimorpermanentsupportforachildovertheageofprovin-

cialmajority,whichisnineteenyearsofage,“whoisunabletowithdrawfromthechargeof

 See Section I, below in this chapter.

 Laroque v.Misling,[]N.W.T.J.No.(S.C.);Akert v. Akert, [] S.J. No.  (Q.B.).

 Re S.N.L .,[] A.J. No.  (Q.B.).

 Zien v. Woida,[]B.C.J.No.(S.C.)(applicationforchildsupportdismissed;alternativebasisfor

dismissa l found in the child’s consent to the adopt ion coupled with the child’s est rangement from his

fatherover the precedingten years).

 Marud v. Marud, [] S.J. No.  (Q.B.).

 Reiss v. Reiss, [] S.J. No.  (Q.B.).

 Penner v. Danbrook (),  R.F.L. (d)  (Sask. C .A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refus ed (), 

R.F.L. (d)  (note) (S.C.C.). See also Hill v. Davis ,[]N.S.J.No. (S.C.).

 C.L.O. v. D.M.L.,[]B.C.J.No.(Prov. Ct.).