Introduction to Statutory Interpretation

• Author: Ruth Sullivan
• Profession: Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa
• Pages: 29-48

29

CHAP TER 2

INTRODUCTION

TO STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION

A. WH AT IS INVOLVED IN INTERPRETATION

When judges or other off‌icials (for example, customs off‌icers or labour

relations boards) interpret legislat ion, they purport to di scover its mean-

ing by reading the language of the text in light of the rules of statutory

interpretation. This stand ard description of the inter pretive task is mis -

leading in a number of respect s. First, the term “discover” implies that

interpreters are archaeologists rather than artists, that their goal is to

locate meanings f‌ixed in t he past rather than create new meanings. This

may be so in theory, but in practice interpret ation involves both archaeol-

ogy and art. Inter preters must work with a text whose wording wa s f‌ixed

in the past, but in reconstr ucting its meaning they must draw on cur rent

knowledge and their own understanding, exper ience, and skills.

The term “meaning” is al so misleading in so far as it bri ngs to mind

thesaura, dictiona ries, and formal def‌initions. What interests i nterpret-

ers is not the abstract meaning of a text, but its meaning in relation to

particula r facts. Dictionar y def‌initions are useful as a star ting point,

but lawyers and off‌icial s need to know how the legislation applies to

the problem with which they are dealing. It is this concrete sen se of

meaning — the text as it applies to particular fact s — that is sought in

statutory interpretation.

Finally, the notion that statutory interpretation is a rule-governed

activity is mi sleading. The “rules” are not really rules in the Dworkian

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION30

sense and therefore they do not impose binding constraint s on judges

and other interpreters.1 The failure to “follow” a rule of statutory in-

terpretation is not an appeal able or reviewable error. Although bad in-

terpretations may be appe aled or reviewed, the error lie s in failing to

interpret the statute correct ly, not in failing to apply a particula r statu-

tory interpretation rule. As Lord Reid wrote in Maunsell v. Olins:

They [the rules of statutor y interpretation] are not rules in the ord in-

ary sense of h aving some bindi ng force. They are our servant s, not

our masters. They are a ids to construct ion, presumptions or point-

ers. Not infrequent ly one “rule” points in one dire ction, another in a

different direction. In each case we must look at all relevant circum-

stances and decide a s a matter of judgment what weig ht to attach to

any particu lar “rule.”2

As Lord Reid indicates, t he rules of statutory inter pretation do not

dictate outcomes in statutory inter pretation cases. If the rules all point

to the same interpretation, the interpreter is effectively bound. Any

alternative interpretation would be set aside as incorrect or patently

unreasonable. But if ordin ary meani ng supports one outcome, while

purpose and presumed intent support another, the interpreter must

rely on his or her own judgment to decide which outcome is better.

Although the rules of statutory i nterpretation do not determine

outcomes, they are indispen sable in formulating the arguments used

by counsel to argue ca ses and by judges to justi fy outcomes once a

conclusion has been reached. However impossible it may be to capture

the actual process of deci sion making— a personal, complex, and often

highly intuitive proces s— the resulting decision requires a legal ju stif‌i-

cation. Statutory interpretation rules supply lawyers and judges w ith a

vocabulary for descr ibing interpretation problems and w ith legally ac-

ceptable reasons for preferring one solution over another. They permit

a judge to say that the interpretat ion adopted is the most appropriate

one in the circumst ances, not because the judge personally prefers that

interpretation, but because it ta kes into account considerations that are

deemed relevant by the rules.

1 Ronald Dworki n writes that rule s are binding; therefore, the y cannot conf‌lict

with one another a nd they produce a single correct outcome. By c ontrast, princi-

ples are not bindin g but operate as pointers —reason s to prefer one solution over

another. It is common for a set of fact s to be subject to conf‌licting pri nciples. See

R.M. Dworkin, A Ma tter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Ha rvard University Pre ss,

1985).

2 [1975] A.C. 373 at 382 (H.L.).