R. v. M.C.H., (1998) 113 O.A.C. 97 (SCC)

• Judge: Lamer, C.J.C., L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache and Binnie, JJ.
• Court: Supreme Court (Canada)
• Case Date: September 24, 1998
• Jurisdiction: Canada (Federal)
• Citations: (1998), 113 O.A.C. 97 (SCC)

R. v. M.C.H. (1998), 113 O.A.C. 97 (SCC)

MLB headnote and full text

[French language version follows English language version]

[La version française vient à la suite de la version anglaise]

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Temp. Cite: [1998] O.A.C. TBEd. SE.021

M.C.H. (appellant) v. Her Majesty The Queen (respondent) and The Attorney General of Canada, The Attorney General of Quebec, The Attorney General of British Columbia and The Attorney General for Alberta (intervenors)

(25561)

Indexed As: R. v. M.C.H.

Supreme Court of Canada

Lamer, C.J.C., L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache and Binnie, JJ.

September 24, 1998.

Summary:

The accused was convicted of sexual assault, contrary to s. 271(1)(a) of the Crim­inal Code and was sentenced to 4.5 years' imprisonment. The accused appealed against conviction and sentence.

The Ontario Court of Appeal, in a judg­ment reported 91 O.A.C. 298, dismissed the conviction appeal and allowed the sentence appeal. The court reduced the accused's imprisonment term to two years less a day and three years' probation. The accused appealed the dismissal of his conviction appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

Criminal Law - Topic 5332

Evidence and witnesses - Confessions and voluntary statements - Voir dire - Necessity and purpose of - The accused was convicted of sexually assaulting the daughter of a close friend - The accused argued that an alleged confession he made to the complainant's family when con­fronted by them was "to a person in au­thority" and that, notwithstanding that defence counsel did not request a voir dire, the trial judge had a duty to hold a voir dire before admitting the confession into evidence - The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that the trial judge did not err in failing to hold a voir dire on his own motion - Although the daughter and her family were capable, in rare circumstances, of being "persons in authority", there was nothing in the evidence at trial to alert the trial judge of the need for a voir dire.

Criminal Law - Topic 5332

Evidence and witnesses - Confessions and voluntary statements - Voir dire - Neces­sity and purpose of - The Supreme Court of Canada discussed the confessions rule and its relation to the person in authority requirement - The court stated that "the unfairness of admitting a confession has historically been addressed by a consider­ation of two factors. First, the voluntari­ness of the statement; and second, the status of the receiver of the statement, that is to say, whether the receiver was a per­son in authority. ... a statement is said to be voluntary when it is made without 'fear of prejudice or hope of advantage' ... the person in authority requirement gen­erally refers to anyone formally engaged in 'the arrest, detention, examination or pros­ecu­tion of the accused' ... This definition may be enlarged to encompass persons who are deemed to be persons in authority as a result of the circumstances surround­ing the making of the statement. ... the purpose of the confessions rule is to exclude putatively unreliable statements, not actual­ly unreliable statements." - See paragraphs 14 to 18.

Criminal Law - Topic 5332.1

Evidence and witnesses - Confessions and voluntary statements - Voir dire - Duty of judge - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "the trial judge has a duty 'to conduct the trial judicially apart from the lapses of counsel'. This includes the duty to hold a voir dire whenever the prosecu­tion seeks to adduce a statement of the accused made to a person in authority. However, where the defence has not requested a voir dire and a statement of the accused is admitted into evidence, the trial judge will only have committed re­versible error if clear evidence existed in the record which objectively should have alerted him or her to the need for a voir dire notwith­standing counsel's silence. ... Evidence which clearly demonstrates that the receiver of the statement made by the accused was closely connected to the au­thorities should alert the trial judge to hold a voir dire. ... It should be empha­sized that only rarely will a trial judge have heard sufficient evidence to trigger the need for a voir dire on the person in authority issue where the receiver of the statement is not a conven­tional person in authority. .. The evidence must suggest that the receiver was acting in concert with the police or prosecutorial authorities, or as their agent, or as part of their team. Only in these circumstances will the trial judge be obliged to hold a voir dire of his or her own motion" - See paragraphs 40 to 47.

Criminal Law - Topic 5334

Evidence and witnesses - Confessions and voluntary statements - Voir dire - Pro­ce­dure - [See first Criminal Law - Topic 5332 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 5352

Evidence and witnesses - Confessions and voluntary statements - Statements to a person in authority - [See both Criminal Law - Topic 5332 ].

Criminal Law - Topic 5353

Evidence and witnesses - Confessions and voluntary statements - Who is person in authority - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that a "person in authority" was typically persons formally engaged in the arrest, detention, examination or prosecu­tion of the accused (peace officer, prison officials or guards, etc.) - However, "per­son in authority" also included those per­sons the accused subjectively believed could influence or control the proceedings against him, subject to the qualification that the accused's belief be subjectively reasonable - The court stated that "where the accused speaks out of fear of reprisal or hope of advantage because he reason­ably believes the person receiving the statement is acting as an agent of the police or prosecuting authorities and could therefore influence or control the proceed­ings against him or her, then the receiver of the statement is properly considered a person in authority" - Personal authority over the accused was not sufficient to establish a person as being a "person in authority" for the purpose of the confes­sions rule - See paragraphs 30 to 36.

Criminal Law - Topic 5353.1

Evidence and witnesses - Confessions and voluntary statements - Statements to per­sons not in authority - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the confessions rule did not apply to the admissibility of state­ments coerced by private individuals (not persons in authority) - Although it was unfair to admit such statements, it was a matter for Parliament to study and remedy - The court stated that in the meantime "in circumstances where a statement of the accused is obtained by a person who is not a person in authority by means of degrad­ing treatment such as violence or threats of violence, a clear direction should be given to the jury as to the dangers of relying upon it. The direction might include words such as these: 'A statement obtained as a result of inhuman or degrading treatment or the use of violence or threats of viol­ence may not be the manifestation of the exercise of a free will to confess. Rather, it may result solely from the oppressive treatment or fear of such treatment. If it does, the statement may very well be either unreliable or untrue. Therefore if you conclude that the statement was obtained by such oppression very little weight should be attached to it'" - See paragraphs 29 to 30.

Criminal Law - Topic 5359.1

Evidence and witnesses - Confessions and voluntary statements - Evidence and proof - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "in relation to the person in authority requirement, the evidence required to establish whether or not a person should be deemed a person in authority will often lie primarily with the accused. The accused therefore must bear some burden in rela­tion to this aspect of the confessions rule. The burden should be an evidential and not a persuasive one. ... In the vast majority of cases, the accused will meet this evidential burden by showing the accused's knowl­edge of the relationship between the receiver of the statement and the police or prosecuting authorities. ... Once the defence discharges its burden and estab­lishes that there is an evidential basis to the claim that the receiver of a statement made by the accused is a person in au­thority, the burden shifts to the Crown to establish beyond a reasonable doubt either that the receiver is not a person in author­ity, or, if this burden cannot be discharged, that the statement was made voluntarily" - See paragraphs 37 to 38.

Cases Noticed:

R. v. Wells (S.W.) (1998), 230 N.R. 183 (S.C.C.), refd to. [paras. 1, 105].

R. v. A.B. (1986), 13 O.A.C. 68; 26 C.C.C.(3d) 17 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1986] 1 S.C.R. v; 68 N.R. 400; 18 O.A.C. 80, refd to. [paras. 9, 72].

R. v. Erven, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 926; 25 N.R. 49; 30 N.S.R.(2d) 89; 49 A.P.R. 89; 44 C.C.C.(2d) 76; 92 D.L.R.(3d) 507, refd to. [paras. 12, 100].

Ibrahim v. R., [1914] A.C. 599 (P.C.), refd to. [paras. 15, 57].

R. v. Prosko (1922), 63 S.C.R. 226, refd to. [para. 15].

R. v. Boudreau, [1949] S.C.R. 262, refd to. [para. 15].

R. v. Ward, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 30; 25 N.R. 14; 14 A.R. 412; 44 C.C.C.(2d) 498, refd to. [para. 15].

R. v. Horvath, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 376; 25 N.R. 537; [1979] 3 W.W.R. 1; 93 D.L.R.(3d) 1; 44 C.C.C.(2d) 385; 7 C.R.(3d) 97; 11 C.R.(3d) 206, refd to. [para. 15].

R. v. Warickshall (1783), 1 Leach 263; 168 E.R. 234, refd to. [para. 17].

R. v. DeClercq, [1968] S.C.R. 902, refd to. [para. 20].

R. v. Buric (G.J.) et al. (1996), 90 O.A.C. 321; 28 O.R.(3d) 737 (C.A.), affd. [1997] 1 S.C.R. 535; 209 N.R. 241; 98 O.A.C. 398, refd to. [para. 21].

R. v. Charemski (J.), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 679; 224 N.R. 120; 108 O.A.C. 126, refd to. [para. 21].

Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Harz, [1967] 1 A.C. 760 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 22].

R. v. Sang, [1979] 2 All E.R. 1222 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 22].

R. v. Piché, [1971] S.C.R. 23, refd to. [para. 22].

R. v. Rothman, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640; 35 N.R. 485; 59 C.C.C.(2d) 30; 121 D.L.R.(3d) 578; 20 C.R.(3d) 97, refd to. [paras. 22, 69].

R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151; 110 N.R. 1; [1990] 5 W.W.R. 1; 77 C.R.(3d) 145; 57 C.C.C.(3d) 1; 47 B.C.L.R.(2d) 1; 49 C.R.R. 114, refd to. [paras. 22, 81].

R. v. R.J.S., [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451; 177 N.R. 81; 78 O.A.C. 161; 36 C.R.(4th) 1; 96 C.C.C.(3d) 1, refd to. [para. 23].

R. v. Whittle (D.J.), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914; 170 N.R. 16; 73 O.A.C. 201; 116 D.L.R.(4th) 416, refd to. [paras. 23, 66].

R. v. Deokinanan, [1968] 2 All E.R. 346 (P.C.), refd to. [para. 28].

Watkins v. Olafson et al., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750; 100 N.R. 161; 61 Man.R.(2d) 81; [1989] 6 W.W.R. 481; 61 D.L.R.(4th) 577; 39 B.C.L.R.(2d) 294; 50 C.C.L.T. 101, refd to. [para. 29].

R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654; 131 N.R. 161; 50 O.A.C. 125; 68 C.C.C.(3d) 289, refd to. [para. 29].

Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. et al. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. et al., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210; 221 N.R. 1; 158 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 269; 490 A.P.R. 269, refd to. [para. 29].

Child and Family Services of Winnipeg Northwest v. D.F.G., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925; 219 N.R. 241; 121 Man.R.(2d) 241; 158 W.A.C. 241, refd to. [para. 29].

R. v. Todd (1901), 4 C.C.C. 514 (Man. C.A.), refd to. [paras. 32, 78].

R. v. Roadhouse (1933), 61 C.C.C. 191 (B.C.C.A.), refd to. [para. 32].

R. v. Berger (1975), 27 C.C.C.(2d) 357 (B.C.C.A.), refd to. [para. 33].

R. v. Trenholme (1920), 35 C.C.C. 341 (Que. C.A.), refd to. [paras. 35, 86].

R. v. Wilband, [1967] S.C.R. 14, refd to. [paras. 35, 91].

R. v. Downey (1976), 17 N.S.R.(2d) 541; 19 A.P.R. 541; 32 C.C.C.(2d) 511 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 35].

R. v. Sweryda (1987), 76 A.R. 351; 34 C.C.C.(3d) 325 (C.A.), refd to. [paras. 35, 82].

R. v. Scott (1984), 1 O.A.C. 397 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 37].

R. v. Morris, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1041; 27 N.R. 313; 26 N.B.R.(2d) 273; 55 A.P.R. 273, refd to. [para. 38].

R. v. McKenzie, [1965] 3 C.C.C. 6 (Alta. C.A.), refd to. [paras. 38, 81].

R. v. Postman (1977), 3 A.R. 524 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 38].

R. v. Sweezey (1974), 20 C.C.C.(2d) 400 (Ont. C.A.), refd to. [paras. 41, 100].

R. v. Thongjai, [1998] A.C. 54 (P.C.), dist. [para. 51].

R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531; 113 N.R. 53; 41 O.A.C. 353; 59 C.C.C.(3d) 92; 79 C.R.(3d) 1, refd to. [para. 57].

Director of Public Prosecutions v. Ping Lin, [1976] A.C. 574 (H.L.), refd to. [para. 58].

R. v. Seaboyer and Gayme, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577; 128 N.R. 81; 48 O.A.C. 81; 66 C.C.C.(3d) 321; 7 C.R.(4th) 117; 6 C.R.R.(2d) 35; 83 D.L.R.(4th) 193, refd to. [para. 59].

Hardy's Trial, Re (1794), 24 State Tr. 1065, refd to. [para. 60].

R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383; 66 N.R. 114; 69 N.B.R.(2d) 40; 177 A.P.R. 40; 25 C.C.C.(3d) 207; 50 C.R.(3d) 289; 26 D.L.R.(4th) 493; 19 C.R.R. 209, refd to. [para. 63].

Lego v. Twomey (1972), 404 U.S. 477 (Sup. Ct.), refd to. [para. 67].

R. v. Paonessa (1982), 66 C.C.C.(2d) 300 (Ont. C.A.), affd. [1983] 1 S.C.R. 660, refd to. [para. 70].

R. v. Stewart (1980), 21 A.R. 300; 54 C.C.C.(2d) 93 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 72].

R. v. Fowler (1981), 36 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 142; 101 A.P.R. 142; 4 C.C.C.(3d) 481 (Nfld. C.A.), refd to. [para. 72].

R. v. Collins (1975), 29 C.C.C.(2d) 304 (Alta. T.D.), refd to. [para. 72].

R. v. McIntyre (M.) (1993), 135 N.B.R.(2d) 266; 344 A.P.R. 266 (C.A.), affd. [1994] 2 S.C.R. 480; 168 N.R. 308; 153 N.B.R.(2d) 161; 392 A.P.R. 161, refd to. [para. 80].

R. v. Amyot (S.) (1990), 30 Q.A.C. 140; 58 C.C.C.(3d) 312 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 81].

R. v. Frewin (1855), 6 Cox C.C. 530, refd to. [para. 81].

R. v. Kyle (1991), 52 O.A.C. 18; 68 C.C.C.(3d) 286 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 90].

R. v. Unger (K.W.) and Houlahan (T.L.) (1993), 85 Man.R.(2d) 284; 41 W.A.C. 284; 83 C.C.C.(3d) 228 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 94].

R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670; 85 N.R. 81; 41 C.C.C.(3d) 385; 64 C.R.(3d) 1; 28 B.C.L.R.(2d) 145, refd to. [para. 94].

R. v. Lomage (1991), 44 O.A.C. 131; 2 O.R.(3d) 621 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 99].

R. v. Pettipiece (1972), 7 C.C.C.(2d) 133 (B.C.C.A.), refd to. [para. 106].

R. v. Powell, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 362; 9 N.R. 361, refd to. [para. 110].

R. v. Park, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 64; 37 N.R. 501; 59 C.C.C.(2d) 385; 21 C.R.(3d) 182; 26 C.R.(3d) 164; 122 D.L.R.(3d) 1, refd to. [para. 110].

Authors and Works Noticed:

Berger, Mark, The Exclusionary Rule and Confession Evidence: Some Perspectives on Evolving Practices and Policies in the United States and England and Wales (1991), 20 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 63, p. 71 [para. 20].

Britain, Criminal Law Revision Commit­tee, Evidence (General)(11th Report) (1972), Comnd. 4991, p. 39 [para. 26].

Canada, Law Reform Commission, Report on Evidence (1975), p. 62 [para. 25].

Canada, Report of the Federal/Provincial Task Force on Uniform Rules of Evi­dence (1982), p. 175 [paras. 23, 63].

Gilbert, Geoffrey, The Law of Evidence (1769), generally [para. 18].

Gillies, Peter, Law of Evidence in Austra­lia (2nd Ed. 1991), p. 537 [para. 27].

Herman, Lawrence, The Unexplored Rela­tionship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part I) (1992), 53 Ohio St. L.J. 101, p. 153 [para. 18].

Kaufman, Fred, The Admissibility of Con­fessions (3rd Ed. 1979), p. 81 [para. 72].

McWilliams, Peter K., Canadian Criminal Evidence (3rd Ed. 1988), vol. 2, p. 15:10730 [para. 86].

Sopinka, John, Lederman, Sidney N., and Bryant, Alan W., The Law of Evidence in Canada (1992), pp. 56, 57 [para. 37]; 351 [para. 76].

Counsel:

Irwin Koziebrocki, for the appellant;

Ian R. Smith, for the respondent;

S. David Frankel, Q.C., for the intervener, the Attorney General of Canada;

Joanne Marceau and Jacques Gauvin, for the intervener, the Attorney General of Quebec;

John M. Gordon, for the intervener, the Attorney General of British Columbia;

Martin W. Mason (written submission only), for the intervener, the Attorney General of Alberta.

Solicitors of Record:

Irwin Koziebrocki, Toronto, Ontario, for the appellant;

The Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, for the respondent;

The Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, for the intervener, the Attorney General of Canada;

The Attorney General of Quebec, Sainte-Foy, Quebec, for the intervener, the Attorney General of Quebec;

The Attorney General of British Columbia, Victoria, British Columbia, for the intervener, the Attorney General of Brit­ish Columbia;

The Attorney General of Alberta, Edmon­ton, Alberta, for the intervener, the At­torney General of Alberta.

This appeal was heard on March 24, 1998, before Lamer, C.J.C., L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache and Binnie, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada.

On September 24, 1998, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada was delivered in both official languages and the following opinions were filed:

Cory, J. (Lamer, C.J.C., Gonthier, McLachlin, Iacobucci, Major and Binnie, JJ., concurring) - see para­graphs 1 to 53;

L'Heureux-Dubé, J. (Bastarache, J., concurring) - see paragraphs 54 to 115.