Fiddling with Head 91(24): Métis Interjurisdictional Immunity
Author | Albert C. Peeling |
Pages | 231-258 |
231
Fid dlin g with Head ():
Métis Interjurisdictional Immunity
.
Whether the Métis in Canad a are “Indians” within the meaning of head
() of the Constitution Act, , has never been conclusively deter-
mined by any court. e question is an important one: if the Mét is are
Indians and within the scope of head (), it follows t hat they are en-
titled to a degree of immunity from provincial legislative and executive
authority under the doctrine of interjurisdictional im munity. Interjuris-
dictional immunit y is a doctrine of constitutional law wh ich establishes
a core of federal jurisdiction in each class of subjects assigned to the fed-
eral government by section of t he Constitution Act, . is core
is b eyond the reach of provincial authority. In this paper I propose to
examine the application of the doct rine of interjurisdictional immunity
to Métis people.
e paper begins w ith an e xamination of whether the Métis are “In-
dians” w ithin the mea ning of the phrase “Indians, a nd Lands reserved
for the Indians” a s it is used in head () of the Constitution Act , .
I then consider the sor ts of activit ies that might be protected from t he
(U.K.), & Vict., c. , reprinted in R .S.C. , App. II, No. .
For an in-depth discussion of the i ssue, see Clem Chartier, “‘India n’: An Ana ly-
sis of the Term as Used in Section () of the Brit ish North America Act, ”
(–) Sask. L . Rev. ; Mark L. Stevenson, “Section () and Canad a’s
Legislative Jur isdiction with Respe ct to the Métis” () Indigenous L.J. ;
Mark L. Stevenson, “Mét is Aboriginal Rig hts and the ‘Core of Indianness’” ()
Sask. L. Rev. .
232 .
reach of provincial laws by the doctrine of interjurisd ictional immunit y.
Finally, I look briey at the dierences between Métis people and Indians
with respect to provincial legislative authority in light of section of the
Indian Act.
A. DO THE MÉTIS FALL WITHIN EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL
JURISDICTION UNDER HEAD OF THE
ConSTiTuTion ACT, 1867?
In this part of the paper, I set out some of the argu ments relating to the
Métis people and the reach of head (). e arguments are doctrinal
and historical, textua l and structural, prudential and ethical . I have bor-
rowed the classication of arguments used here from Phillip Bobbitt’s
helpful work on constitutional a rgumentation, Constitutional Fate. In
addressing the question of whether the Métis are Indians within the
meaning of head () of the Constitution Act, , I propose to draw
heavily upon Bobbitt’s typolog y and will dene each archetype of argu-
ment as I discuss and apply them.
e rst archetype Bobbitt sets out is historical, which he de nes as
argument that relies on the intent of the constitutional draers and the
beliefs and attitudes prevalent at the time of raticat ion.
Historical argument is argument based on legislative intention. In
terms of the question of the scope of head () of the Constitution Act,
, one must consider the intention of both the Fathers of Confedera-
tion and the imperial Parliament. It is also necessar y to consider w hat
the intention was in and whether that original intention was altered
by the amendment of the Constitution in .
Tex t ua l argument relies on the current understanding of t he words
of the text.
e words i n head (), “Indians, and Lands reserved for t he In-
dians,” do not provide us with an obvious answer to the questions we
are asking: “W ho are Indians?” a nd specically, “Are Métis Indians?”
Furthermore, t he quest for meani ng is not helped by t he Confederation
Indian Act, R.S.C. , c. I-.
Philip Bobbitt, C onstitutional Fate: eory of the Co nstitution (New York: Oxford
University Press, , ).
Ibid. at .
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