Métis Self-Government: Reflections on the Way Forward

• Author: Fred Caron
• Pages: 391-410

391

  

Métis Self- Gove rnme nt:

Reflections on the Way Forward

 

A. INTRODUCTIO N

In this paper I approach t he question of Métis self-government from

three vantage points: that of the recent past, the present, and the future. I

will seek to situate Métis self-government within t he constitutional hist-

ory of the past t wo decades, suggest how I believe the Powley decision

and other developments have changed the legal landsc ape in respect of

Métis self-government, and oer some thoughts on where Métis self-

government mig ht move in the years a head. It is not my intention to

be prescriptive, but rather, to stimulate furt her thinking on the part of

Métis representatives, provincial a nd federal government ocials, ad-

vocates, and others. For this reason, t he paper poses some key questions

that I believe wil l need to be addressed primarily, but not exclusively, by

the Métis parties to th is discussion, in order to move forward toward a

meaningfu l exercise of self-government for the Métis people.

B. FROM CHARLOTTETOWN TO POWLEY: A COMPRESSED

HISTORY

I turn rst to consider where we have come from on the Métis self-gov-

ernment front. e Aborigina l self-government debate writ la rge has

 R. v. Powley, []  S.C.R.  [Powley].

392  

mainly been a debate about rig hts: whet her Aboriginal peoples have a

right of self-government within t he meaning of sec tion () of the Con-

stitution Act, , what the scope of that right might be, and who the

holders of the rig ht would likely be. Given that so many advances for

Aboriginal peoples over t he past three plus decades have resulted from

movement on the legal front, either t hrough constitutional amendment

or court decision, it is hardly surprising that t he discours e has been

framed in terms of legal rights. Nevertheless, it can be helpful to set aside

the rights discourse, if only briey, to consider what lies at the core of the

self-government project.

) The Charlottetown Accord

In my v iew, the movement to recogni ze, articulate, a nd implement Ab-

original self-government is about achievi ng a realignment of power

sharing and decision making wit hin the federation among federal, prov-

incial, and Aboriginal governments and institutions, as well as a realign-

ment of the lines of accountability between these political entities and

their constituents. Implicit in this realignment is the need to re-establish

Crown–Aboriginal relationships on a more respe ctful and collaborative

footing. When viewed from this perspective, it may be easier to under-

stand t he central st ruggle that lay at the heart of t he various attempts,

in the s and early s, to amend t he constitutional text to provide

explicitly for an inherent right of sel f-government, as exemplied by the

Charlottet own Accord. I am referring, here, to the debate over whether

a right of self-government depended for its exercise, or even its existence,

on the content of negotiated agreements (the contingent right approach),

or whether the right was fu lly enforceable independent of government

agreement (the inherent approach).

For their part, federal and provincial governments believed that such

a signicant realignment of power sharing should be negotiated among

 (U.K.), , c. .

 e accord was signed  August  in C harlottetown, Prince Edwa rd Island,

aer intensive negotiat ions involving the federal, prov incial, and territoria l

governments, and representat ives from the Assembly of First Nations , the Native

Council of Cana da, the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, a nd the Métis National Counci l.

It was defeated on  October  in referend a held nationally and in Quebec .