Interjurisdictional Immunity and Métis Aboriginal Rights: A Provincial Perspective
Author | P. Mitch McAdam |
Pages | 259-288 |
259
Interju risd icti onal Immunit y an d Mé tis
Aboriginal Rights: A Provincial Perspective
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A. INTRODUCTIO N
In R. v. Powley, the Supreme Court recogniz ed for t he rst time that
contemporary Métis communities can possess Aboriginal hunting and
shing rig hts that fall within the protection of section () of the Con-
stitution Act, . In a companion case, R. v. Blais, the Court held that
Métis pe ople are not “Indians” for t he pur pose of exercising the hunt-
ing, shing , and trapping rights set out in the Natural Re sources Trans-
fer Agreements (NRTAs) applicable in the pra irie provinces, which were
conrmed by t he Constitution Act, . Although the reasoni ng of the
Court in Blais suggests that Métis people are not “Indians” for the pur-
pose of section () of the Constitution Act, , that issue was not dir-
ectly add ressed — it remains high ly contentious. It will undoubtedly be
addressed in other cases , one of which will ma ke its way to the Supreme
e arguments set out i n this paper with respec t to interjurisdictiona l immunity
and Métis rights reect the position taken by the attorney general of Saskatchewan
in Paul v. British Columbia (Fores t Appeals Commission), [] S.C.R. [Paul]
and in R. v. Morris, [] S.C.R . [Morris].
[] S.C.R. [Powley].
Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), , c. .
[] S.C.R. [Blais].
- Ge o. V, c. (U.K.).
Above note at para. . Con stitution Act, (U.K.), & Vict., c. , reprinted
in R.S.C. , App. II, No. .
260 .
Court. In this paper, I do not intend to address the broader issue concern-
ing whether Métis people are Indians for the purpose of section () of
the C onstitution Act , . Rather, I will assume that Métis people are,
constitutionally, “Indians” and will then examine the implications of the
constitutional doctrine known as interjurisd ictional immunity for on-
going provincial regulation of the exercise of Métis Aboriginal hunting
and shing rights, referring to recent developments in the jurisprudence.
It must, however, be kept in mind that the juri sprudence w ith respect
to the recognition of Métis Aboriginal rights remains in a n embryonic
state and the jurisprudence with respect to interjurisdic tional immunity
as it applies to Aboriginals is complicated. e convergence of these two
issues results in a complex constitutional conundrum.
B. WHAT IS INTERJURISDICTIO NAL IMMUNITY?
e doctr ine of interjurisdictiona l immunity is one of the most poorly
understood concepts in Ca nadian constitutional law. e basic idea can
be stated quite simply: each of the various heads of federal jur isdiction
set out in s ection of the Constitution Act, , carries with it a basic,
minimum, and unassailable core that is o limits or immune from the
application of provincial laws that aect the federal subject-matter. e
Supreme Court recently cla ried that for the doctrine to be applicable,
the provincial law must “impair” the federal matter. e application of
the doctrine is not dependent upon the existence of a contradictory fed-
eral law.
In his textbook, Constitutional Law of Canada, Prof. Peter Hogg indi-
cates t hat the general rule is that provincia l laws apply to Indians and
lands reser ved for Indians, subject to ve important exceptions, one of
which is interjurisd ictional immunit y. He describes the doc trine in this
context as follows:
e second exception to the general r ule that provincial laws apply to
Indians and lands reser ved for the Indians is “Indiannes s”. A provincial
law that aects “an integral pa rt of primary federal jurisdiction over In-
dians and lands reserved for the Indians” wil l be inapplicable to Indians
Canadian Wester n Bank v. Alberta, SCC at para. [Canadian Western
Bank].
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